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Global Infrastructuring of Labour: Lamu-Port a Success Case?

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Abstract

The paper examines the emerging large-scale infrastructure project, Lamu Port. The port is expected to be a tourism hub and economic zone, creating millions of jobs and addressing marginalisation in the coastal region. In addressing the reconstruction of Lamu County, Kenya's northern coast, it is hypothesised that the infrastructuring of Lamu has contributed to the reorganisation of the county through labour relations, land use, and increased organised violence—legitimising and monopolising the use of force by the state. Al-Shabaab, a Violent Extremist Organisation (hereafter VEO), takes advantage of Lamu, which is characterised by semi-territoriality—spaces which have limited government control, but the state shifts to legitimise and monopolise control when there is interest, such as the construction of the port; such strong control is hereafter defined as a state territoriality scenario. Sixty-three interviews were conducted with key government representatives, security personnel, civil society, and communities in Lamu, Garissa, and Tana River. The investigation is on how locals are being infrastructured in this ongoing mega-development project and its effect on security. The results show a major facelift in infrastructuring in the coastal region, highlighting how such infrastructuring produces and reproduces the history and future of labour and security in Lamu County, Kenya.

Keywords: Infrastructuring, Organised Violence, Territoriality, Labour, Land, and Lamu County

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Introduction

Kenya's northern coast, bordering the south of Somalia's coast, Lamu County is going through a process referred to in this writing as infrastructuring labour, the mobilization of different forms of labour, such as unskilled and skilled, in the process of construction. Such a process leads to the remaking and reshaping of the territory through intensification of land use and modernisation.³ Previously, the northern coast was neglected by colonial and post-colonial governments, with a focus on the southern coast of Mombasa County.⁴ As such, the neglect led to a limited government presence, making Lamu territory an easy island for criminal activities, bordering the Indian Ocean, Somalia, and Boni Forest. The neglect and limited government presence is hereby referred to as semi-territoriality—a scenario where the state authority is fluid and shifts from strong to weak depending on the government's interest and capacity.⁵ This situation describes Lamu's environment, Boni, a forest neighbouring Somalia, as a borderland for criminal activities. Poaching has greatly reduced the wildlife population, making the Boni forest a biodiversity hotspot, and terror attacks are breeding in Lamu due to such limitations and the fluidity of the government's presence.

The county is going through the development of a large-scale port that aims to connect the northern coast to Sudan and Ethiopia through Kenya's pastoral north, and Lamu is the gateway and connection of the proposed Lamu-Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport (LAPSSET) corridor. LAPSSET is a mega-infrastructure, aiming to create thirty-two berths, road networks, a standard gauge railway, an oil pipeline, a refinery, and airports along the corridor, a metropolis city that attracts more than one million people in Lamu, and a special economic zone.⁶ The project is referred to as a game-changer with the aim to boost geoeconomic, connecting landlocked countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda to the international waters in Lamu, and regional integration along the horn of Africa. The first phase of the port project is funded by the Kenyan government and built by the Chinese state-owned enterprise, the Chinese Communication Construction Company (CCCC), which won the tender in 2013.⁷ The paper analyses labour relations between this

company and workers in Lamu, looking at how the county is going through infrastructuring—different forms of labour, such as skilled and unskilled labour that are mobilised in the process of construction of LAPSSET, and how such infrastructuring marginalise the Lamu residents from labour relations and the extremist group in Somalia takes advantage of such marginalisation.

Kenya has labour unions affiliated with the Central Organization Trade Union (COTU-K). However, trade union movements are political formations formed by elected leaders who were fighting colonial oppression; thus, it is difficult to separate trade unions from Kenyan politics, and COTU-K has become a political tool for the benefit of the regime in power).⁸ In addition, the country has a framework of seven labour laws, but the conduct of these laws is questionable when it comes to protecting workers, especially unskilled labourers, who are the focus of this writing as casual workers.

The new development in Lamu has created a new shift and the state security apparatus has been increasing owing to its strategic position as a port for the upcoming large-scale infrastructure.⁹ However, with the increased security plan, which is referred to in this chapter as infrastructured labour—forms of labour relations such as labour laws, regulations, and increased security work that arise from the process of infrastructuring, the county is affected by insecurity due to the porous borders in the Boni forest area bordering Somalia, and the state is applying a strong presence of military and police in the region to secure the LAPSSET project. The conflict between the Orma pastoralists and Pokomo in Tana River attracts al-Shabaab, a violent extremist organisation (VEO) or jihadist group based in Somalia and affiliated with al-Qaeda.¹⁰ Badurdeen¹¹ points out that Lamu County still faces insecurity; the localities of the county experience weapons and drug trafficking through boat riders and fishermen in exchange for money; areas such as Kiwayuu and Ndau in Lamu are known for al-Shabaab sympathisers, thus, it is a safe haven for recruitment, gangs, and criminal activities.

The results and findings are informed by the writers' research experience, 63 interviews from government offices, civil society, security personnel, and communities in Ijara region in Garissa, Pate, Rubu, Kiunga, Dodori National Reserve, Witu, Mpeketoni,

and Mkokoni in Lamu County; and Garsen and Borobini in Tana River County were triangulated with the secondary sources from peer-reviewed writing, government documents, and newspaper articles totaling 73 documents. The following research questions were the focus during data collection: 1) How is Lamu County going through infrastructuring? 2) How does such infrastructuring marginalise the Lamu residents from labour relations, and 3) why does the extremist group in Somalia take advantage of such marginalisation? The Boolean operators such as ‘AND,’ ‘OR,’ and ‘NOT,’ and concepts derived from the research questions, helped in the selection of secondary data. The research questions also helped with the formation of the semi-structured interviews. These data was analysed through thematization—“a method for identifying, analyzing, organizing, describing, and reporting themes found within a data set”.¹² Thus, the results were gathered into themes, or what is known as thematic analysis, generating information from the various primary and secondary data, highlighting the differences and similarities in the data. Thereafter, developing an unanticipated perception and understanding.

The draft of this article was first presented at a conference at the United States International University (USIU). It was later presented at the European Conference on African Studies (ECAS) 2023 in Cologne,¹³ and it was also presented at a conference on the ‘implementation of the Community land Act’ in Nairobi, with attendees such as the Kenyan Ministry of Lands and the Food and Agriculture Organization, hosted by the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA). Reviews from these conferences assisted in the shaping of the draft, and information from the conferences served as part of the primary data. Interviews were collected between 2019 and 2024, and such was advantaged by the writer's involvement in a power mapping project for the Search for Common Ground (S4CG, 2019), and the European Union Horizon 2020 ICT4COP project on Community-Oriented Policing (ICT4COP, 2020).

The implementation of labour and security laws is wanting in Lamu, land grievances and the community land law amendment process are ongoing. Despite this, Lamu County is being

infrastructured—forms of labour relation such as increased security along the project arising from the infrastructuring of Lamu port. To understand such development, the paper is divided into five sub-sections; 1) the history of labour and infrastructure in Kenya, 2) the impact of the port on Lamu residents, 3) the continuity and effect of infrastructuring of labour on organized violence in Lamu County, 4) the port, land issues, and infrastructuring of labour in Lamu County; and 5) labour relations and Chinese marginalization of the Kenyan workers. The article's conclusion highlights that security work and plans require community engagement, building trust through community involvement and engagement in decision making,¹⁴ a psychological and sociological strategies of territoriality—influence and control of space,¹⁵ as opposed to the physical aspect of territoriality.¹⁶

Conceptualizing Infrastructuring, Labour and Organized Violence

Infrastructure

Infrastructure refers to the organizational and physical structures required for society's operation. In other words, it is the structures of objects that facilitate or hinder the movement of materials, goods, people, and information.¹⁷ Infrastructure produces and mediates between various entities, and it encompasses a wide spectrum of services and activities that are central to economic activities. Though he does not define the concept of infrastructure, Geisler¹⁸ explains land use and investment in agricultural production and development that supports African local economies, which is essential in understanding infrastructure development and its link to labour and violence. He points out that the appropriation of *terra nullius* doctrine—land assumed to be owned by nobody, leads to violence against local communities' access to resources and rights when it comes to the development of such land. As such, the link is essential in understanding land use and how it is connected to labour and the emerging infrastructure. Wekesa et al.¹⁹ affirm that the critical components of infrastructure are communication and transport systems, water and waste management, and energy supply. Despite the exemplary definition, the authors do not link infrastructure with labour and violence.

The article does fill such a gap by providing a comprehensive definition, link, and analysis of infrastructure, labour, and violence. Lesutis²⁰, and Enns and Bersaglio²¹ emphasize that infrastructure is not only a physical structure but can be relational, built for a specific purpose, people, and future. These authors add that investments in infrastructure reorganize territories, create new material realities, reconfigure the ecosystem, and extend the uneven political economy. Similar to the statements above, infrastructure is not only physical construction but also saturated with political and social significance that influences the local expectations and dynamics.²² Infrastructure is not just about the physical networks but also the socio-material configurations that impact communities' operation within a particular system.²³ This article focuses on such a definition, defining infrastructure as a process of remaking Lamu territories, changing the ecosystem, and reorganizing the livelihood within the county, which is referred to as infrastructuring. As such, the reorganization and remaking impacts violence in Lamu, forcing the government to reorganize security in the county.

Labour and Violence

The article defines labour as a workforce that is either skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled, linking labour to Lamu's infrastructure and explaining how this link leads to contestation and violence in the county. Njiru et al.,²⁴ links labour and infrastructure as a critical input to production in line with Robert J. Barro's²⁵ framework—a broader concept of capital production that balances the non-human capital (physical infrastructure such as electricity and road network) and human capital (workforce, training, and education). Such a framework emphasizes that without a balance of both labour and infrastructure, there is limited sustainability of economic growth. In reference to the Kenyan case Njiru et al.,²⁶ points out that despite the government's investment in physical infrastructure, there is a disconnect with the workforce because of limited coordination, leading to unemployment and the poor realization of the purpose of the physical infrastructure.

Mkutu et al.,²⁷ discuss labour in relation to economic opportunities that emerge with infrastructure. They also link labour, infrastructure, and violence, pointing out that infrastructure projects may lead to

dispossession and conflict. The authors add that local communities might lose their livelihood and land due to such infrastructure development, and the expectation of labour opportunities created by the infrastructure may lead to competition for resources, differences and displacement among ethnic groups. Thus, violence is a potential outcome that arises from the infrastructure projects due to the anticipating of the benefits that emerge with infrastructuring. The link between labour and infrastructure is conceived as a complex socio-economic system of workforce and societal development that the latter concept either disrupts or supports. In other words, networks such as road economies and transport systems affect social reproduction and labour dynamics.²⁸ The implications of labour emerge with the remaking and infrastructure development, leading to uncertainty and racial capitalism. As such, the dynamics of creating infrastructure impact the condition of labour, leading to inequalities.²⁹

Lesutis,³⁰ Enns and Bersaglio,³¹ point to 'infrastructural violence,' referring to the injustice and harm caused by the implementation and design of infrastructure. Such implementation disrupts social ecologies and everyday life. Infrastructure development can lead to physical and social harm to marginalized communities, hindering them from accessing essential services and mobility patterns.³² Such development can also perpetuates racial, colonial, and gendered inequalities.³³

History of labour and infrastructure in Kenya

In 1884, Africa's land and labour were the theme of the Berlin Conference, imagining the continent as a frontier awaiting settlement, commerce, infrastructure, and improvement.³⁴ Such themes have not changed much today, African land is experiencing mismanagement, indifferent elites, corruption, failed land reforms, and ethnic conflicts.³⁵ Communities in Africa view land in terms of ethnic territory, cultural heritage, and as a resource for economic benefit—it produces labour and profit. Therefore, Land is a link to ethnic identity and an economic resource for prosperity; it influences the politics of redistribution, ethnicity, security, and belonging, and Kenya is such an example.³⁶ The Case of Lamu County and the

development of the LAPSSET ports show changes in land use, infrastructuring labour in the County, but also shows aspects of infrastructured labour—forms of labour relations emerge from the infrastructuring processes, politics over land and development are creating insecurities, shaping and risking livelihoods in Lamu.

Lamu County, a coastal island region in Kenya, is a semi-arid area that was occupied by the Sultane from Zanzibar as the Swahili coast stretches from Zanzibar to the coast of Somalia in East Africa. In the 19th century, Lamu's population was about 6 thousand inhabitants, and the area was occupied by Afro-Arabs, Indians, and Hadrami, who served as slave masters, and the Omani and Busaidi were invited to Lamu as the upper-class society also served as landowners.³⁷ With the emergence of British colonial government labour laws shifting in Kenya, the legal emancipation of slaves was enacted in 1907, but due to the neglect of Lamu, laws were enforced on the northern coast in 1910. Mombasa Island was more of a priority for the colonial government than Lamu island, thus, subjecting the latter Island as a backwater.³⁸ This neglect continued with the post-colonial government concentrating on the port in Mombasa as an entry to East Africa, developing the town into the first capital of Kenya. New developments such as increased government presence through organised violence—territoriality, security, plans, and land use changes labour relations due to the constructions of the LAPSSET projects, the article refers to this as infrastructured labour—forms of labour relations that emerge from construction, planning of labour, and restructuring of land in Lamu County. Currently, the Island is dominated by the Bajuni ethnic group, with the Sanye, Aweer, also known as Wa-Boni the minority living in Boni Forests, Orma pastoralists,³⁹ Somalia,⁴⁰ Giriama and Pokomo.⁴¹ In defining the concept of terraqueous territoriality, Foley and Mather⁴² point out that communities and small-scale producers are always victims of global conglomerates and state legitimising control, particularly if there is interest in claimed spaces. Historically, the communities mentioned above have been marginalised due to the central government's focus on Mombasa but with limited interest in Lamu. Most of these ethnic groups, particularly the Bajuni, were brought to Lamu to work on plantations as

slaves.⁴³ The county also has Kikuyu ethnic groups who settled in Mpeketoni, southwest of Lamu, between 1973 and 1975 under a Kenyatta settlement scheme.⁴⁴ The county has an area of 6,283 square kilometers, it is the least populated county with 143,920 people according to the 2019 census. It is divided into Lamu East, which is scarcely populated, and Lamu West is densely populated.⁴⁵ However, with the development of the port, the county's population is rapidly increasing, the land is increasingly appreciating, traditional labour such as fishing is shifting to modern ones such as working on the construction of the port, and infrastructuring of labour creates new systems of infrastructured labour. The former concept connotes the process of mobilisation of labour such as recruitment of unskilled labour, which emerges with violation of labour laws, and the latter concept refers to different labour relations that emerge from infrastructuring, such as increased security work, and new land tenure system, all that lead to the scramble for Lamu County and insecurity.

The impact of the port on the Lamu residence

The African continent has depended on external funding for infrastructure development. External donors include Official Development Assistance (ODA), trade credits, foreign direct investments, and remittances. Such funding for developing countries' projects was affected by the financial crisis of 2008-2009.⁴⁶ As such, the crisis affected the shift of African countries to seek new external financing for their development and infrastructure projects. The LAPSSET project is a case in point, attracting public-private partnership, which involves the Kenyan government and the Chinese Communication Construction Company (CCCC), a private entity.⁴⁷ The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which involves Chinese public and private companies, has been publicised as a win-win development initiative that is a means of exporting excess Chinese labour to different construction companies abroad.⁴⁸ This has been hyped as a benefit to Africa's infrastructure, improving economic well-being, creating jobs, and promoting industrialisation (Githaiga and Bing, 2019).⁴⁹ However, this has also led to new challenges in terms of security, labour, and land use.

The uncertainty of oil in South Sudan, the global drop in oil prices, the withdrawal of Uganda from LAPSET, and the insecurity in arid northern Kenya have led to delays and changes in the project. Okwany⁵⁰ points out that these uncertainties also led to the withdrawal of some earlier investors from Brazil, South Korea, the European Union, India, Qatar and Japan, who were interested in the LAPSET project, leaving only the CCCC as a partner in the project. The Lamu-Port is worth \$24 billion/2.5 trillion Kenya shillings, the infrastructure is the anchor to the logistical corridor, which aims to serve South Sudan and Ethiopia through northern Kenya.

The port attracted 13 ships in 2022, handling 213 tons of conventional cargo and 1821 twenty-foot container equivalent units (TEUs) since its completion.⁵¹ The port has two phases; the first phase has 3 berths and the second has 29 berths.⁵² The three berths are constructed by the Chinese construction company, funded by the Kenyan government, and are almost 90% complete, while the second phase comprises the twenty-nine berths, which will be financed by private investors, and with the hope of more international partners. The thirty-two berths intend to cover 6km along the Indian Ocean in Mamba Bay, Lamu. The aim was to construct three berths by 2016; however, the berths are underway and are yet to be completed due to uncertainties and insecurities, which pushed the withdrawal of sceptic partners.

Vast literature points out that such small-scale fisheries and communities living along the coastal line are always victims of corporates' interest in the seas,⁵³ and states grabbing of ocean territory.⁵⁴ Since the idea of the LAPSET project, there has been no clear policy framework on how the residents affected by the project will benefit,⁵⁵ and the Kenyan government has failed to provide adequate information concerning the project, leading to uncertainty and community anxiety. This inadequate information creates difficulties for community participation. The project has created a scramble for Lamu County; land in the old town has become expensive, with the risk of losing natural heritage, such as the Lamu Archipelago.⁵⁶ Internal conflicts around the LAPSET project are emerging, as Lamu residents are already complaining about their fishing industry being affected by the new port with no

communication from the Kenyan government⁵⁷ and there are claims of land grabbing with the anticipation of profiting from LAPSET.⁵⁸

The port shapes land use in Lamu, and the LAPSET creates politics of anticipation⁵⁹ of land and development leading to political patronage. LAPSET faces a lack of community participation, inadequate information, and consultation, and the indigenous people around the project face threats to access to natural resources, livelihoods, and land rights.⁶⁰ Despite the mega-project's rhetoric such as *Building Africa's Transformative and Game Changer Infrastructure to Deliver a Just and Prosperous Kenya*,⁶¹ there are anxieties over the project due to the historical treatment of communities in arid northern Kenya and also semi-arid regions such as Lamu, which is one of the poorest counties. Thus, the LAPSET project is an initiative that creates infrastructuring of labour that reorganises and reproduces Lamu's history, and increases the state's physical presence, defined in this article as territoriality.

The strong state control is evident particularly in spaces of states interest such as land bordering the sea,⁶² and the concept territoriality is often associated with cementing state power and control over spaces,⁶³ thus, it has been defined with the focus of physical or military control⁶⁴ or state rational thinking of organised violence.⁶⁵ However, it can also be psychological and sociological.⁶⁶ As such, the article emphasises this sociological and psychological aspect of territoriality in infrastructuring of labour in Lamu, strengthening constitutive diversity, and state sharing the benefit and burden with the local communities as opposed to forceful eviction and poor treatment which works for the advantage of the VEOs.

The launch of LAPSET in March 2012 led to ethnic conflicts in the neighbouring County of Tana River. The August 2012 ethnic clashes between Oromo pastoralists and Pokomo farmers over land were triggered by election campaigns over the LAPSET project. The violence left more than 118 people dead in August 2012, displaced about 13,500 and about 30,000 affected by the ethnic conflict.⁶⁷ The violence escalated, leading to the formation of a commission of enquiry,⁶⁸ and a decision to deploy Kenya's Defense Forces (KDF) in Tana River County,

neighbouring Lamu.⁶⁹ However, the ethnic conflict increased in 2013, and the government deployed more than 2000 paramilitary police, the General Service Unit (GSU),⁷⁰ and by the end of 2013, more than 160 had been killed.⁷¹

The evidence of increased government security presence demonstrates the fluidity of territoriality in Lamu which leads to semi-territoriality; the state has the capacity to secure its territory but due to limited resources and sometimes neglect leads to insecurity (see, for example, some of the works on the fluidity of territoriality in Kenya.⁷² Lamu, in this case, exemplifies a semi-territoriality scenario, al-Shabaab can exist in these areas, but with infrastructure developments, there is a shift explained in this article as infrastructuring of labour in Lamu, which changes labour relations, increasing security plans and shifting land use from communal to privatization. Thus, the announcement of LAPSSET created a land speculation economy, increasing prices and the rush for land in Lamu, leading to corruption over land acquisition and title registration.⁷³ The project also led to contestation between native communities and migrants in Lamu. As such, this anticipation of land, corruption over land, and title acquisition attracted al-Shabaab propaganda, leading to various attacks in Lamu since 2014.

On June 15, 2014, a group of more than 30 al-Shabaab men entered Mpeketoni town in the western part of Lamu County at 2045 hours, attacking the police station and the administration police camp, targeting and killing individuals from the Kikuyu community, who were the majority ethnic group, and the death toll counted to 51 people, including the police.⁷⁴ The attack led to the former Lamu West constituency member of parliament, Julius K Ndegwa, who is a Kikuyu, blaming the opposition party and the Lamu Governor, Issa Timamy, who is an Arab Muslim, and was voted by the supporters of the opposition parties. Another attack took place the next day, killing nine people, and Abdulaziz Abu Musab, the al-Shabaab spokesperson, claimed responsibility. Even with such a claim of responsibility, the former President Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, blamed the opposition party over the incident. Uhuru claimed that the attack was an ethnic profiling of the Kikuyu community; the opposition party affirmed that such claims were unjustified.⁷⁵

However, the attacks were motivated by the new development of LAPSSET in the County, which created anticipation of land, mobilisation of workers, labour relations, and increased migration into Lamu.

The al-Shabaab propaganda highlighted Kenya's first president, the late Jomo Kenyatta's decision to settle Kikuyu squatters in Mpeketoni. President Kenyatta, the father of the former president, Uhuru Kenyatta, settled the Kikuyus in Lamu under the government project⁷⁶ referred to as the Kenyatta Settlement Scheme of 1973-75, and the VEO propaganda claimed that the settlers (Christians) were taking Bajuni's (Muslims) land. The VEO used the attack to win the hearts and minds, taking advantage of Lamu's land grievances. The attackers claimed that Wageni (migrants) were taking land from Wenyeji (natives) because of the speculation of the LAPSSET project.⁷⁷

The Mpeketoni attacks spread al-Shabaab narratives as a retaliation of the Kenyan government's organised violence fight for radicalisation along the coast and northeastern Kenya.⁷⁸ In addition, al-Shabaab used Mpeketoni to claim a continuity of the retaliation to the KDF operation in Somalia, and the VEO magazine, *Gaidi Mtaani*, which was popular between 2013 and 2017, spread propaganda on how migrants target Land in Lamu, subjecting the native through organised violence.⁷⁹ In 2020, al-Shabaab targeted the United States Military base at Mamba Bay in Lamu County, and 2021 saw repeated attacks in the County and its neighbouring counties, such as Garissa and Tana River, which escalated in 2023, marking Lamu as a region with terrorist activities.⁸⁰ Thus, infrastructuring of labour⁸¹ in Lamu, both government security plans were shaped, and this created an increased attack by al-Shabaab.

Results and discussions: Continuity and effect of infrastructuring of labour on organized violence in Lamu County

The development of Lamu Port attracted land grabbing due to the anticipation of the forthcoming LAPSSET, particularly Lamu Port for the geographical case understudy in this chapter. The announcement of the project led to an informal demarcation of land in the forested areas of Lamu,

including the advertisement of plots for sale after the announcement of the LAPSSET project in 2012. This rush for land awakened the historical grievances over the settlement of migrants, leading to insecurities, and it also created uncertainty in the neighbouring County, Tana River, over the ethnic conflict between pastoralists and farmers.⁸² The author's experience of the July 2019 power mapping research carried out for Search for Common Ground in Garissa and Tana River counties strongly indicates that there is tension over land and insecurity in the Boni forest bordering the two counties. The Lamu neighbouring areas, such as Ijara, are al-Shabaab's hideout territories; the areas have a relatively low security presence, and the VEO operates clandestinely.

The VEO hideout and clandestine operations are possible due to the limited government security or neglect of Lamu County, and the article emphasises such a scenario in this chapter as semi-territoriality. Currently, there is an increased security plan and presence in these areas, which is referred to in this writing as a shift of the state's organised violence from semi-territoriality—limited security due to capacity and interest, to territoriality—legitimisation and monopolisation of physical control. This shift is what is referred to as infrastructured labour in this chapter, forms of labour relations emerging from the infrastructuring of labour. In this case, the construction attracts new security plans and the enforcement of heavy security to guard the construction areas. The heavy KDF and General Service Unit—a paramilitary of the national police service along the LAPSSET Lamu-Garsen project area creates stress on the movement of nomadic pastoralists seeking pasture.⁸³ Interviews with security agencies in Bura and Masalani in Garissa, Garsen in Tana River, and Kipini in Lamu, including Nairobi offices⁸⁴ confirmed that the neighbouring areas within the LAPSET map have stress between the Pokomo farmers and Orma nomadic Pastoralists, and al-Shabaab takes advantage of the conflict, projecting the propaganda of the Pokomo dominating the Tana River County government.

Tana River projects have been skewed towards large-scale irrigation, targeting the LAPSSET infrastructure,⁸⁵ and the Orma pastoral community claims that the government favours the Pokomo

farmers.⁸⁶ This allegation escalated the 2012 conflict between the two tribes, which killed more than 200 people, after the launch of LAPSSET in Lamu, and the narrative of the killings was used in Lamu by the al-Shabaab militia.⁸⁷ As such, the state has increased organised violence—monopolisation and legitimisation of the use of force in Lamu and its neighbouring counties to counter such ethnic conflict, but more so, to ensure security, and attract investors to the LAPSSET project. The author experienced the new development of security in Lamu and its neighbouring counties, the Tana River and Garissa, during the fieldwork in 2019. Heavy paramilitary police, the General Service Unit (GSU), including KDF roadblocks, are evident in the Garsen area, a region in Tana River, neighbouring Lamu.

On 5 January, 2020, al-Shabaab targeted the Kenyan navy base, Camp Simba, in Mamba Bay near Magagoni Airfield, a base close to the construction of the port; the AFRICOM⁸⁸ base is commonly used by a joint military operation of the United States (US) and KDF. The attack killed three US soldiers, and two civilians working at the base, and four others suffered injuries. The attack also destroyed one KDF and five United States aircraft, two helicopters, several fuel tankers and two military vehicles in the operation⁸⁹ that had between 30-40 al-Shabaab fighters.⁹⁰ The attack led to the closure of Lamu Airport, and the Chinese Communication Construction Company issued a memo for the suspension of the construction until security was guaranteed.⁹¹

The increased attacks by al-Shabaab led to changes in Lamu with the new security plans, the government increased security personnel to guard the construction of LAPSSET,⁹² and deploying multi-agency security and roadblocks in Lamu and its neighbouring counties, particularly the Boni forest bordering Somalia from Lamu and Garissa Counties.⁹³ Despite this increased security to guard the construction of the project, al-Shabaab attacks continue along the Somalia-Kenyan border.⁹⁴ The VEOs continue to target construction workers and equipment along Ijara-Sanghailu-Hulugho an 83kilometer road construction, the stretch from Lamu, Ijara to Garissa which is a 257kilometer road construction, and the 113 Hindi-Bodhei-Basuba-Kiunga road,⁹⁵ which stretches across Boni forest.

The year 2022 saw heavy al-Shabaab attacks, and one of the attacks killed five construction workers and injured three after a heavy al-Shabaab ambush on a construction site in the Majengo area of the Boni forest. The attack led to the suspension of the construction of the LAPSSET corridor along the Lamu-Ijara-Garissa Road, resuming in May 2022.⁹⁶ The VEO also targeted casual labourers' motorcycles and construction vehicles⁹⁷ On 11 January 2023, al-Shabaab planted Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) along the LAPSSET road in Bura East, Tana River County, hitting a Kenya National Highway Authority (KeNHA) vehicle, and killing three KeNHA engineers and one person on board the vehicle.⁹⁸ One week later, the VEO attacked a convoy of LAPSSET construction workers near the Bodhei Police GSU camp and police station along the Lamu-Ijara road, a border between Lamu and Garissa Counties. The convoy was heading to their workstation from a Chinese camp in the area, and one person died in the attack and five people, including one KDF soldier, were injured.⁹⁹ As such, the sporadic attack affirms the analysis of Lamu County and its environment as a semi-territoriality scenario. The LAPSSET project creates a shift exhaustively defined in this article as the infrastructured labour in Lamu, heavy security presence, and new security to guard the construction sites due to increased infrastructuring of labour in the County.

To emphasise the semi-territoriality scenario, Lamu and its neighbouring Garissa County have experienced an increase in IED attacks targeting civilians and security officers.¹⁰⁰ The devices were al-Shabaab tactical attacks, and in June 2023, more than 20 KDF soldiers were killed by the IEDs. The then Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration, Kithure Kindiki appearing before the parliamentary committee, affirmed the increase in al-Shabaab presence in Lamu. Kindiki confirmed that between June and July 2023, about thirty-seven teachers and 30 security personnel were killed by al-Shabaab. The security forces killed 60 al-Shabaab forces on the 1st of August 2023, and these VEO forces were thwarted before their operations.¹⁰¹ However, two people died during the process of engagement between the al-Shabaab and the security forces. In the same month, on 15 August 2023, the

VEO attacked a convoy travelling on the Lamu-Mombasa A7 highway, killing at least three people.¹⁰² The highway was a target because of its connection to Mombasa, the only viable route for the construction of the ongoing Lamu port project.

On 10 September 2023, a contractor of the LAPSSET project suffered a head injury after running over an IED, along the Milimani-Baure road in Lamu, and hours later, a KDF patrol vehicle ran over an al-Shabaab-planted IED on the same road, and the device killed an unknown number of soldiers in Bodheri Majengo.¹⁰³ A retaliation exercise was carried out on 12 September 2023 by the KDF, killing approximately five al-Shabaab soldiers. As such, infrastructuring of labour is ongoing, and the increased attacks confuse Lamu residents, despite the heavy security personnel in Lamu County.¹⁰⁴ This increased insecurity incidences are a result of the development of the Lamu port, which impacts the populace's livelihoods in terms of construction and planning. The insecurity has increased despite the strong presence of the government, this makes territoriality or organised violence fluid and shifts due to the limited capacity of the security personnel.

The Port, Land Issues and Infrastructuring of Labour in Lamu County

The Lamu port project is changing the labour structure in the County, and the majority of the residents are aware of the LAPSSET and are welcoming the project. Nevertheless, there are great concerns about the lack of information and consultations from the government and public participation. Out of the 1.3 billion Kenyan shillings claim of land acquaintances, the government has paid one billion.¹⁰⁵ However, there is no formal engagement mechanism to ensure that the Lamu residents benefit from the project. Lamu County is yet to benefit from the equalisation fund,¹⁰⁶ and the bill guiding the fund is still in parliament.¹⁰⁷ The Lamu residents fear forceful eviction, loss of their fishing rights and culture, conflict over resources, and marginalisation over the opportunity brought by the port, which includes loss of tourism,¹⁰⁸ which is already affected by the al-Shabaab clandestine operation in Lamu.

Land in Kenya has different views; first, it means ethnic territoriality—the heritage of the people/communities occupying it; second, it is viewed as money. The former view connotes that land is a physical territory that gives a sense of belonging, and the latter means that land is an individual/community property. Coastal Kenya has experienced great land grievances, and the politics of the region are mostly shaped by land issues.¹⁰⁹ Currently, Land in Lamu is under the government Lands Act (1948) Cap 280, which was revised in 2010, and it gives the commissioner of Lands, who is an executive representing the president, powers over land that is under government jurisdiction. This act gives the president the right to allocate land to any entity, and customary rules are not recognised under this law; thus, the government can respond to any obligation that is of public interest with regard to the use of land.

Essentially, there are overlaps that came with the 2010 Constitution, which gave the devolved government power as custodian of land; these overlaps led to conflict between the Lamu County government and the National Land Commission. The anticipation of LAPSET already led to tension between the former Lamu governor, Issa Timamy, and the National Land Commission, which allocated 28,300 hectares of land to the LAPSET project; the former governor pointed out that there was no consultation from the Lamu County government, which is the custodian of county land under the new framework of land laws.¹¹⁰

The Trust Land Act Cap 288 (revised in 2012) and Land Group Representation Act 1968 (revised in 2012) were repealed to the Community Act 2016, which is currently in parliament for revision and its implementation is on hold, but the infrastructuring of labour in Lamu is not.¹¹¹ The Land Consolidation Act Cap 283 and the Land Adjudication Act Cap 284 stipulate the assertion of the rights and interests of the land. Yet, they remain active as separate land laws. The problem with implementing these laws is that the adjudication issues and steps to be taken take time, they require at least 3 to 5 years, and there is an overlap with different land laws. In 2012, there were more than 10 Acts of Parliament on land laws,¹¹² some of which were repealed by the Community Land Act of 2016. Still, the lack of land policy has created gaps when it comes to the guidance of land

use in Kenya.¹¹³ Thus, with the bottleneck decision-making at the land offices,¹¹⁴ and the grievances of land in Coastal Kenya, the residents of Lamu risk losing their heritage and property through the ongoing LAPSET project that creates infrastructuring of labour in Lamu.

According to the Ministry of Land and Physical Planning, 60,000 people will be displaced, but LAPSET will increase Lamu County's population to approximately 1.25 million.¹¹⁵ This demography leads to the scarcity of resources in Lamu. An interview with the former director general, Sylvester Kasuku,¹¹⁶ and the former chair, Titus K. Ibui,¹¹⁷ of the LAPSET Corridor Development Authority (LCDA) confirmed the assumption that such large projects will not interfere with the environment and natural resources is a false promise. Thus, Lamu is going to change drastically to become more of an urban city, which means changes in land use, labour, and security.

The United Nations Educational Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) acknowledges and regrets that the LAPSET transforms Lamu and affects traditional fishing and cultural heritage since the County is a world heritage site.¹¹⁸ The organisation emphasises 'sharedness' as a political and territorial issue. Sharedness means commonality, community, communality, and constitutive diversity of people building a common interest or a common project.¹¹⁹ As such, the article emphasises community involvement and sharing the burden and benefit as Lamu goes through a process of development. Yet, state territoriality risks traditional fishing rights and Lamu's tourism economy. The port destroys the seagrass, coral reefs, and mangrove forests, which serve as nests for turtles and fish. In May 2018, a four-judge bench of Joel Ngugi, Pauline Nyamweya, John Mativo, and Beatrice Jaden at the Malindi high court ordered a compensation of 1.76 billion to the Indigenous community in Lamu Island within a one-year period. The court order titled *Mohammed Ali Baadi vs Attorney General and others* is yet to be realised, and the three berths are complete, with two in operation. An interview with Save Lamu initiative chairperson demonstrated that;

The Lamu residents still have no understanding of LAPSET and how they are going to benefit from the

*job opportunities from the port project. The government has not honored the court order, yet the project stopped the fishing, and those affected are yet to be compensated.*¹²⁰

Environmentally, the project will cause the loss of habitat for birds, invertebrates, and fish; the area of Makanda to Dodori Creek and Manda Bay will lose two hectares of mangrove land.¹²¹ The Lamu Archipelago will face structural changes and development, and the port will be located at the Mkanda channel, leading to the loss of the strategic fishing area in the Faza and Kizingitini areas on Pate Island and Kiunga in Kiwayu.¹²² Thus, the development of the LAPSSET port leads to infrastructuring of labour, and it also increasingly creates human insecurity due to al-Shabaab sporadic attacks, but also environmental insecurity, including changes in land use.

Labour Relations and Chinese marginalisation of the Kenyan workers

Many Lamu residents have benefited from the port construction, leaving their fishing traditions for formal employment by the CCCC. The completion of the three berths costing \$2.1 million or Kenya shillings 310 billion has invited nineteen ships docking at the port, which indicates trade for the country and more jobs for the Lamu residents.¹²³ The company has training programs for Kenyan students in port management. Though such training is said to be skewed towards favouritism.¹²⁴ The former President Mwai Kibaki had earlier offered a government scholarship grant for one thousand youth from Lamu to be trained on the LAPSSET port operations. The scholarship amounting to \$0.36 million or Kenya shillings 57.4 million was misallocated and did not benefit the Lamu youth. Edward Ouko, the former auditor general, indicated that \$0.12 million or Kenya shillings 1.8 million spent on the scholarship did not involve the Lamu youth and cannot be confirmed to have been spent.¹²⁵ Such misallocation of funds demonstrates irresponsibility and favouritism, and despite the framework of Labour laws, there is laxity when it comes to the conduct of these laws and the protection of workers.

Kenya has seven labour laws that protect the labour relations. The 2010 Constitution creates a framework of labour laws and relations. Article 27 of the document specifies a non-discriminatory order, and Article 36 of the same document stipulates the right to association. Article 41 of the document stipulates labour relations, the right to work, and treatment at work. The Employment Act of 2012 strengthens these rights, labour relations, and orders against harassment at work. The law also stipulates the right to sickness, maternity, and annual leave, as well as the right to termination notice.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 2010 stipulate the welfare, health, and safety of workers, and the Labour Relations Act 2007 orders employment disputes, trade unions, rights to association, and economic and social justice through collective bargaining. The Labour Institution Act 2012 defines collective agreement and the contract of service, and it establishes national labour bodies such as the Labour Administration and Inspection Authority and the National Labour Board. In addition, the Industrial Court Act of 2011 created courts to handle labour and employment disputes. Internationally, Kenya is a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which stipulates the rights of workers, freedom from forced labour and slavery, and the right to join trade unions. However, the implementation of these laws is questionable, and labour institutions fail to keep the government accountable.

The leadership of the Central Organization for Trade Union Kenya (COTU-Kenya) and its affiliates¹²⁶ are politicised, working with the regime in power as opposed to keeping the government accountable for labour laws and relations.¹²⁷ COTU-Kenya and its affiliated institutions are weak and cannot undertake their functions, such as educating workers, advocating and lobbying for good labour market policies and employment environment.¹²⁸ In addition, COTU-Kenya cannot consolidate its trade union movement to demand better working conditions for Kenyan workers.¹²⁹ Thus, despite these labour institutions, unskilled labourers in Lamu face discriminatory and health issues with poor contracts that do not give them security of tenure.

By the year 2020, the project had employed about one thousand Kenyans and 200 Chinese, and none of the one thousand Kenyans were in managerial positions. Such Kenyan workers were facing job insecurity due to arbitrary rules and weak unionisation at the job site.¹³⁰ Gambino added that the Chinese working conditions are better than those of the Kenyan workers, who are majority hard labour workers. The Chinese are served food by the CCCC, while the Kenyan workers have to buy their food at the canteen which is 2.5 kilometer away from their working site, and this makes lunch hours difficult due to the long working hours with little time given for lunch.

The workers claim that there are no clear terms of employment and dismissal from work with no tenure security. The working hours are more than the required eight hours as prescribed by the Chinese contracts; workers claim that they work more than eight hours with no overtime pay.¹³¹ In addition, there are language barriers and discrimination against native workers at work sites. Furthermore, the workers claim that they pay for the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), currently changed into the Social Health Authority (SHA) in 2024. Still, the health insurance that most of the labourers pay for is limited and is not accredited to all the hospitals. Thus, in the case of health issues, workers face treatment challenges and risk termination because some of the contracts are made daily or end within a period of three months.¹³² A truck driver for the CCCC earns approximately \$200, or 25-35 thousand Kenyan shillings per month.¹³³ Despite these labour issues, the Kenyan government has been defending Chinese discrimination against Kenyan workers, claiming the future benefits of the project.

Conclusion

The Lamu Port, a gateway of the LAPSSET large-scale project, is infrastructuring labour in Lamu County, leading to anticipation of land. It has awakened the historical grievances of settlements and land in the county, and it is also creating marginalization of Lamu residents through labour. Since the announcement of the LAPSSET project, there have been grievances over land, leading to an

increase in conflicts over land in Lamu and its neighbouring counties. The August 2012 conflict between the Orma pastoralists and Pokomo farmers in Tana River County was triggered by the launch of LAPSSET in March 2012, and election campaigns politicised the connection of the project to the Tana River irrigation project.

The 2013 contract between the Chinese company, the CCCC, and the Kenyan government initiative to champion LAPSSET and build the first three berths triggered such grievances. The former President Uhuru Kenyatta's commitment to the Lamu port triggered the historical settlement scheme enacted by his father, the late President Jomo Kenyatta, who settled squatters from the Kikuyu tribe in Mpeketoni in the 1970s. This attracted grievances among settlers, Lamu immigrants, and natives. As such, land grievances have attracted al-Shabaab narratives and focused on Lamu County, leading to the 2014 Mpeketoni attacks which killed sixty-one people, mostly from the Kikuyu ethnic community, and such attacks have been sporadic to date, the VEO targeting construction workers and equipment, including the heavy deployment of security personnel to guard the LAPSSET project.

Such attacks in Lamu impacted the reorganisation of county security, shifting the government's interest in the county to protect the project; this has invited a heavy security presence, shifting Lamu from a semi-territorial to a territoriality scenario. The security plans and increasing security in construction sites are what has been defined in this article as infrastructured labour—the forms of labour relations that emerge from the processes of infrastructuring of labour in Lamu. There are heavy KDF and paramilitary police, GSU, and evidence of roadblocks along highways and small connecting roads. Nevertheless, with the limited development of the county and porous borders in the Boni forest, territoriality shifts from strong to weak depending on the spaces in which the government is guarding, such as the construction sites.

The port is changing the county through infrastructuring of labour—the CCCC casual jobs offer is attracting unskilled labour, and many Lamu residents are shifting from their traditional fishing to work on the contraction sights. However, those who

work for Chinese companies face discriminatory work conditions and have poor contracts with weak tenure security. As such, the framework of the Kenyan labour laws, which created labour institutions and the conduct of such institutions, is questionable, as unskilled workers face severe health and discriminatory issues.

As Lamu goes through a transformation process through infrastructuring of labour, there are beneficiaries to the urbanization of Lamu to the exchequer, but also insecurities that come with loss of community land, eviction, and discriminatory labour laws that attract extremists' narrative over land grievances. The government applies the physical aspect of territoriality, which is ineffective and limited due to a lack of capacity. The article recommends the application of sociological and psychological aspects of territoriality, engaging the community through building trust, strengthening labour relations and laws that are of interest to the Lamu community, and improving border security, not by policing the community but policing WITH the community.

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Credit authorship contribution statement

The conception or design of the work, data collection, data analysis and interpretation, critical revision of the article, and final approval of the version to be published were done by the authors.

Ethical Compliance All interviews conducted involving human participants were in accordance with the Kenyan government's ethical standards and guidelines, following approval of the authors research permit obtained between 2019 and 2023 by the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovations (NACOSTI) board to conduct the study.

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³ Chome, 2020

⁴ Nunow, 2012

⁵ Okwany, 2023

⁶ Chome, 2020

⁷ Okwany, 2021

⁸ Bore, 2023

⁹ Davitti et al., 2021

¹⁰ Hansen et al., 2019

¹¹ Badurdeen (2023)

¹² See, Clarke & Braun, 2017; Nowell et al., 2017, p. 2

¹³ <https://nomadit.co.uk/conference/ecas2023/paper/68169>

¹⁴ Lid and Okwany, 2020

¹⁵ Okwany et al., 2023

¹⁶ Jo, 2024, Sassen, 2013

¹⁷ Okosun et al., 2023, Muciaccia and Tedeschi, 2023

¹⁸ Geisler, 2012

¹⁹ Wekesa et al., 2016

²⁰ Lesutis, 2022

²¹ Enns and Bersaglio, 2024

²² Mkutu et al., 2021

²³ Lesutis, 2022

²⁴ Njiru et al., 2020

²⁵ Robert J. Barro, 1990

²⁶ Njiru et al., 2020

²⁷ Mkutu et al., 2021

²⁸ Lesutis, 2022

²⁹ Enns and Bersaglio, 2024

³⁰ Lesutis, 2022

³¹ Enns and Bersaglio, 2024

³² Lesutis, 2022

³³ Enns and Bersaglio, 2024

³⁴ Geisler, 2012

³⁵ Boone, 2014

³⁶ Jenkins, 2012

³⁷ Curtin, 1983

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- ³⁸ Romero, 1986
- ³⁹ These pastoralists follow the Tana River as their water source.
- ⁴⁰ Somali ethnic community mostly pastoralists border Lamu County from Garissa and Southern Somalia.
- ⁴¹ The Pokomo and Giriama are the farmers who depend on Tana River water for agricultural produce.
- ⁴² Foley and Mather, 2019
- ⁴³ Martin and Ryan, 1980
- ⁴⁴ Gambino, 2020; Chome, 2020
- ⁴⁵ KNBS, 2019
- ⁴⁶ Naudé, 2010
- ⁴⁷ Adogo et al., 2025; Okwany, 2021
- ⁴⁸ Wissenbach and Wang, 2017
- ⁴⁹ Githaiga and Bing, 2019
- ⁵⁰ Okwany, 2021
- ⁵¹ Kimanthi, 2022
- ⁵² Davitti et al., 2021
- ⁵³ Pinkerton, 2013
- ⁵⁴ Pedersen et al., 2014; Pinkerton and Davis, 2015; Knott and Neis, 2017; Foley and Mather, 2019
- ⁵⁵ GoK, 2015
- ⁵⁶ KHCR, 2014
- ⁵⁷ Rodden, 2014
- ⁵⁸ Chome, 2020b
- ⁵⁹ Individuals within government institutions take advantage of their position and institutional knowledge to buy land in the prediction of profit and preparation for upcoming government projects.
- ⁶⁰ Tiampati, 2015
- ⁶¹ Kochore, 2016, p. 495
- ⁶² Foley and Mather, 2019
- ⁶³ Sassen, 2013
- ⁶⁴ Jo, 2022
- ⁶⁵ Debarbieux et al., 2023
- ⁶⁶ Sack, 1983, Sack, 1986, Theonugraha, 2021, Okwany, 2023, Okwany et al., 2023
- ⁶⁷ KRC, 2012
- ⁶⁸ Mayabi, 2012
- ⁶⁹ Daily Nation, 2012
- ⁷⁰ Daily Nation, 2013
- ⁷¹ Chome, 2020
- ⁷² Okwany, 2023; Okwany et al., 2023; Okwany and Owino, 2022
- ⁷³ Mutemi and Bocha, 2014
- ⁷⁴ Okwany, 2016
- ⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ⁷⁶ Gambino, 2020
- ⁷⁷ see, for example, the politics of land and development in Lamu by Chome, 2020a
- ⁷⁸ Anderson, 2014
- ⁷⁹ Okwany, 2016
- ⁸⁰ Badurdeen, 2023
- ⁸¹ Mobilisation of different forms of labour such as skilled and unskilled labour.
- ⁸² Okwany, 2020
- ⁸³ Fieldwork experience in April and July 2019.
- ⁸⁴ Interviews with multiple security agencies such as the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPTSC), Kenyan police headquarters in Nairobi, and County commissioners' offices in Lamu and Tana River including police and KDF roadblocks in Garsen between 2019, 2021 and 2023.
- ⁸⁵ Fieldwork experience in April and July 2019 and September 2021.
- ⁸⁶ Interview with Orma pastoralists in Garsen, July 2019.
- ⁸⁷ Interviews in Masalani Tana River and Ijara Garissa, April and July 2019.
- ⁸⁸ A joint military operation between the United States and African militaries; KDF in the case of Lamu.
- ⁸⁹ Interview with security personnel in Mamba Bay in November 2021.
- ⁹⁰ Funk, 2021
- ⁹¹ Interviews with Lamu residence in Mamba Bay, November 2021.
- ⁹² Interview with the Northeastern police Commissioner George Seda, December 2022.
- ⁹³ Fieldwork experience in May 2023,
- ⁹⁴ ACLED, 2023
- ⁹⁵ Interview with a KeNHA engineer in Nairobi. April 2023.
- ⁹⁶ Fieldwork experience in 2019 and 2022.
- ⁹⁷ Hussein, 2023
- ⁹⁸ Fieldwork experience in 2019 and 2022
- ⁹⁹ Ombati, 2023a
- ¹⁰⁰ Interviews with the Assistant County Commissioner, GSU and KDF personnel in Garsen town, April 2019.
- ¹⁰¹ Ombati, 2023b
- ¹⁰² A telephone interview with a security expert from Mombasa, 29th August 2023.
- ¹⁰³ Daily Nation, 2023
- ¹⁰⁴ ADF, 2023
- ¹⁰⁵ Interviews with LAPSET Board members, April and September 2019.
- ¹⁰⁶ Interviews with Lamu County members of the county assembly, and beneficiaries of the Equalization funds in Lamu, November 2021
- ¹⁰⁷ PoK, 2023
- ¹⁰⁸ Kilio cha Haki, 2014
- ¹⁰⁹ Notes from the land conference on Implementation of the Community Land Act, June 13th - 14th 2022.
- ¹¹⁰ Beja, 2017
- ¹¹¹ Interviews with land experts, National land Commissioners, and land Adjudicators, June 2022.
- ¹¹² Doshi, 2012
- ¹¹³ Notes from the land conference on Implementation of the Community Land Act, June 13th - 14th 2022.
- ¹¹⁴ Interviews with land adjudicators and government employees at the Ministry of Land and Physical Planning, June 2022.
- ¹¹⁵ Information from MoLPP on the implementation of the Community Land Conference hosted by IFRA, June 13-14, 2022.

¹¹⁶ Interview with the director general of the LCDA board, April 2019.

¹¹⁷ Interview with the chair of the LCDA board, Titus K. Ibui at the maritime dispute symposium, September 2019.

¹¹⁸ UNESCO, 2023

¹¹⁹ Debarbieux et al., 2023

¹²⁰ Interviews with the Save Lamu initiative chairperson, Somo M Somo, June 2022.

¹²¹ Kilio cha Haki, 2014, GoK, 2013

¹²² Interview with Lamu residents in Kuinga in East, April 2019

¹²³ Interview with the Kenya Port Authority personnel in Mombasa, November 2021

¹²⁴ Our chapter on Patron-Client relations in this book.

¹²⁵ Mutai, 2017

¹²⁶ There are about 45 COTU-Kenya affiliates who represent workers in different platforms, see for example, <https://cotu-kenya.org/affiliate-members/>

¹²⁷ Interviews with three Labour law experts, February and April 2023

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Working experience and interaction with union leaders and workers in Nairobi, 2017 to 2021.

¹³⁰ Gambino, 2020

¹³¹ Interview with Lamu workers in the construction sites in Mamba, November 2021

¹³² Interviews with the CCCC casual labourers and residents in Lamu, 2019 and 2020

¹³³ Interview with track drivers along Lamu -Garsen road, April 2019.

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